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The issue presented in this article is the 
problem of specificity of the features which 
constitute the prohibited acts whose definitions 
contain the term "condition under the influence" 
and the term "condition after consumption." One 
must take note of the fact that the lack of definition 
of clear quantitative limits of narcotic drugs in the 
content of the penalizing regulation does not make 
it unconstitutional. Although prima facie this 
situation may raise doubts related to the procedural 
safeguards, there is a number of important reasons 
for not providing specific ratios. However, it must 
be emphasized that both the doctrine and the 
jurisprudence point at the lack of possibility, or 
significant difficulty, to create an exhaustive list of 
narcotic drugs and their precise threshold ratios on 
which the criminality of individual behavior would 
depend. 
This article aims at providing general 
information on the subject to the broader public, 
and explaining reasons behind the status quo, rather 
than at solving the arising legal problems. The 
commitment embodies the intention to launch an 
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 The subject matter of this paper is the 
problem of specificity of the features which 
constitute the prohibited acts whose definitions 
contain the term "condition under the influence," 
which is a feature of the offense specified in Art. 
178a (1) of the Penal Code, and the term "condition 
after consumption," which is a feature of the 
misdemeanors described in Art. 86 (1), Art. 87 (1 
and 2), and Art. 96 (1) of the Misdemeanors Code.  
 Constitutionality of penal regulations 
depends on the implementation of a number of 
propositions by the legislator. Among the principles 
pertaining to correct - from the point of view of the 
legislator's rationality - classification of prohibited 
acts, of particular importance is the principle of 
specificity of penal provisions, as expressed in the 
Latin maxim nullum crimen sine lege certa. The 
principle of specificity of repressive regulations is a 
substantive requirement that must be met by penal 
law [1]. The evaluation of fulfillment of the above 
requirement depends on the functional 
interpretation of the content of the analyzed law. 
One must determine in abstracto whether the 
content of the regulation adequately defines what 
actions the perpetrator may perform to constitute 
any given offense [1]. Moreover, laws must specify 
prohibited behavior in a way that enables a clear 
distinction between the types of behavior that are 
prohibited by law and the types that are not 
prohibited (which corresponds to the function of 
external specificity of an act) and that allows one to 
differentiate various types of prohibited acts (the 
function of internal specificity of an act) [2]. It must 
be emphasized that one of the principal functions of 
penal law is to induce the persons to whom the law 
is addressed to observe it. What contributes to the 
achievement of this is clear information about what 
acts are prohibited and the perpetration of what acts 
will lead to penal responsibility [2]. 
 Some premises on which penal 
responsibility depends may be defined in sub-
ordinate legislation. Consequently, the features of 
offenses may be specified in a more detailed way 
[3]. It should also be noted that, pursuant to Art. 42 
(1) of the Polish Constitution, "the use, in the 
description of the features of a prohibited act, of an 
evaluative and ambiguous description does not 
automatically constitute a violation of the nullum 
crimen sine lege principle" [3].
 
This principle, 
reflected in penal laws of democratic law-abiding 
states [4] makes it possible to decode a number of 
requirements that should be met by repressive laws 
that are compliant with constitutional standards [5]. 
 Even a cursory analysis of regulations that 
penalize behaviour involving threats to traffic 
safety leads to the conclusion that the Polish 
legislature, partly because of the legislative 
technique, has never decided to define the premises 
of the aforementioned offenses and misdemeanors 
based on specific threshold ratios in relation to 
weight, spatial quality, or volume criteria, which 
would enable clear classification of actions 
committed under the influence of a narcotic drug as 
offensive or not [6].
  
 
Although prima facie this situation may 
raise doubts related to the procedural 
safeguards, there is a number of important 
reasons for not providing specific values.  
 For the clarity of the deliberations, one can 
start by giving examples of terms of similar 
meanings. The term "narcotic drug" is so general 
and ambiguous that it is virtually impossible to give 
the same clear criteria of illegality pertaining to all 
narcotic substances. What is a narcotic drug is 
dependant on the Drug Addiction Counteraction Act 
and the annexes referring to it [7].
 
On the other 
hand, the phrase "significant quantity" has been 
feature of offenses that were classified in all 
successive laws on drug addiction [8].
 
The Supreme 
Court, in its deliberations on the meaning of this 
phrase in case no. I KZP 10/09 [9], refused to make 
a resolution due to the lack of the requirement to 
provide a basic interpretation of laws (Art. 441 (1) 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure). It was noted 
that the legislator deliberately abstained from 
defining the phrase "significant quantity" of 
narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and poppy 
straw, enumerated in Art. 53 (2), Art. 55 (3), Art. 56 
(3), and Art. 62 (2) of the Act on Countering Drug 
Addiction, thus obliging courts to determine it each 
time and guaranteeing the practical implementation 
of the principle of appropriate penal response.  
 "Threshold ratios" are a difficult issue 
from the point of view of both prosecution policies 
and legislative techniques. It is difficult to provide a 
precise definition of this term for several reasons. 
The first is the imperfect diagnostic methods. The 
diagnostic methods that have been used so far do 
not guarantee error-free, simple, quick, and 
relatively inexpensive quantitative determination of 
the concentrations of specific substances in the 
bodies of drug users. Consequently, unlike in the 
case of alcohol, it is not possible to accurately 
determine the "boundary conditions" of criminal 
responsibility. In the case of alcohol, the legislator 
makes a firm assumption that the presence of the 
substance in a human body has a specific 
detrimental influence on psychosomatic capacities. 
In the case of THC and other narcotic drugs of this 
type, there is no "averaging effect" to speak of. 
Thus, the legal situation of a drunken person is less 
subject to error because the diagnostic techniques 
for determination of constitutive elements of 
misdemeanors or offenses are thorouglily reliable. 
This is not possible in the case of narcotic drugs. 
The reason is that tests for presence of narcotic 
drugs in the body do not make it possible to 
determine the quantity of the drug consumed; as a 




result, they do not determine how intoxicated the 
tested person is. Moreover, the estimated average 
time of detection of psychoactive substances (using 
low-precision screening tests, between 2 days in the 
case of amphetamine and 10 days in the case of 
methadone and its derivatives) makes it harder to 
precisely determine the time of contact with 
narcotic drugs [10]. 
 
In conclusion, one must take note of the 
fact that the lack of definition of clear quantitative 
limits of narcotic drugs in the content of the 
penalizing regulation does not make it 
unconstitutional.  
 
Condition under the influence and after 
consumption of a narcotic drug de lege lata 
 A condition "under the influence of a 
narcotic drug" is a condition that, by acting on the 
central nervous system, in particular impairing 
psychomotor activities, causes the same effects as 
consumption of alcohol that leads to drunkenness 
[11]. Being under the influence of a narcotic drug 
constitutes an attribute of an offense described in 
Art. 178a of the Penal Code.  
 One should define the characteristics of the 
condition after consumption of substances that have 
similar effects to alcohol, which include narcotic 
drugs, whose effects are equivalent to those 
resulting from consumption of alcohol [11].  
Consequently, the behavior that has the 
attributes of a misdemeanor described in Art. 86 (2) 
of the Misdemeanors Code is causing a hazard to 
traffic safety on a public road, in a residential zone, 
or a traffic zone, committed through failure to 
exercise proper care while in a condition after 
consumption of alcohol or another substance of 
similar effects.  
 Due to the limited scope of this paper, one 
must focus on a more detailed interpretation of the 
features of the condition after use of a substance of 
similar effects to alcohol. Determination of the 
meanings of this term (feature) would make it 
possible a contrario to determine the meanings of 
the other. Logically, it is not possible to 
simultaneously be in a condition under the 
influence of a narcotic drug and in a condition after 
the consumption of a narcotic drug. Of course, this 
does not mean that it is not necessary to prove in a 
penal proceeding the meeting of the features of the 
"condition under the influence" of a narcotic drug. 
 The issues related to substances of similar 
effects to those of alcohol are discussed in the 
subsidiary legislation. Until 20 July 2014, narcotic 
drugs were enumerated in a list included in the 
Regulation of the Minister of Health [12]. To a 
certain degree, this issue is currently regulated in a 
similar manner - which is to be discussed further in 
this paper. 
 Section 2 of the Regulation contained a list 
of substances that have effects similar to those of 
alcohol (and, in the legislator's opinion, that 
resulted, as a minimum, in a condition after the 
consumption), as well as the conditions and 
methods of tests to be performed on drivers or other 
persons who are subject to reasonable suspicion 
that they could drive a vehicle, in order to 
determine presence of substances of similar effects 
to alcohol in the bodies of the tested persons.  
 Substances of similar effects to alcohol 
were substances designated as opiates, 
amphetamine and its analogs, cocaine, 
tetrahydrocanabinols, benzodiazepines, and 
barbiturates [13]. Diagnostics aimed to confirm 
the presence of the condition under the influence of 
the aforementioned substances consisted in 
simultaneous or separate performance of saliva, 
urine, and blood tests [14].  
 The aforementioned diagnostic tests are 
quite complex, much more than those performed in 
the case of suspicion of intoxication with alcohol. 
Saliva was tested using the immunological method, 
blood (two samples) was analyzed in a laboratory 
using the gas chromatography and gas spectrometry 
method connected with mass spectrometry, or 
another instrumental method [15].  
Urine was tested using similar methods as 
those used for blood tests. The Regulation defined 
the contents of the individual substances (LOQ - 
limit of quantification), above which their presence 
in the results had to be mentioned. The results of 
the tests had to be recorded in test reports.  
 This way, the quantitative ratios of 
individual substances were determined. One must 
note the fact that the Regulation required 
determination of the presence of the substances in 
the tested samples (if their quantities were equal to 
or higher than the threshold ratio), which did not 
automatically lead to the conclusion that the 
tested person was automatically considered to be 
under the influence of a narcotic drug.  
 At present, this issue is regulated in a 
partly different way. Pursuant to Art. 129j (1) of the 
Traffic Law [16], in principle, tests aimed to 
determine the presence of a substance of effects 
similar to those of alcohol in a human body are 
performed using methods that do not require 
laboratory testing. Pursuant to Art. 2 of the Traffic 
Law, laboratory tests are performed when the 
condition of the tested person prevents using 
methods that do not require laboratory testing or 
when the person refuses to undergo tests using such 
methods. In such a case, the presence of a substance 
which causes effects similar to those of alcohol is 
determined by way of a blood test or a urine test.  
 Based on the delegation provided for in 
Art. 129j (5), a new Regulation was issued [17]. 
The new Regulation contains a shorter list of 
substances, and specifies in more detail and 
expands the list of the diagnostic methods.  
Also, the new Regulation modifies the threshold 




ratios of the contents of substances whose presence 
in the samples must be mentioned in the test report.  
 
Diagnostic difficulties and the problem of legal 
qualification of an act 
 Due to the aforementioned imperfection of 
the diagnostic methods, there are adjudication 
problems related to qualification [18] of behavior 
consisting in driving a motor vehicle under the 
influence or after the consumption of a narcotic 
drug [19].
 
In the aforementioned judgment, the 
Supreme Court noted that, given the lack of 
appropriate diagnostic measures, determination of 
the actual condition may in many cases be 
impossible. There is no doubt that it is always very 
difficult. It is difficult to determine whether the 
offender, whose psychomotor capacity (impaired 
by consumption of narcotic drugs) is beyond 
question, is "under the influence" of a narcotic drug 
or in a condition "after consumption" of such a 
substance. The Supreme Court demonstrated that 
the legal qualification of the act should not be 
determined on the basis of the probability of 
meeting the legal features of an offence. 
Consequently, given the frequent uncertainty, it is 
necessary to observe the in dubio mituis principle 
and be more lenient on the perpetrator. The 
Supreme Court noted that the aforementioned 
principle is directly derived from the in dubio pro 
reo principle. Basically, with respect to criminal 
responsibility, the Supreme Court put an equal sign 
between the condition "under the influence" of a 
narcotic drug and the condition of "drunkenness" 
caused by consumption of alcohol. The same 
applies to the condition "after the consumption" of 
a narcotic drug, which was made equal to the 
condition "after the consumption" of alcohol. Most 
opinions that can be found in legal doctrine share 
this point of view [20].  
Thus, detection of a narcotic drug in the 
blood of a driver of a motor vehicle, depending on 
the factual circumstances, leads to responsibility for 
a misdemeanor and in some cases (where lack of 
significant doubts does not justify observing the in 
dubio mitius principle) - responsibility for an 
offence [21]. However, the latter depends on the 
condition that the behavior of the person 
demonstrates a disorder of psychomotor activity 
typical of drunkenness or, as appropriate, the 
condition after consumption of alcohol. The latter 
circumstance, which defines the feature of an 
offense or a misdemeanor, cannot be determined 
diagnostically but, in principle, requires testimony 
of witnesses. 
 
De lege ferenda prospects? 
Thus, impairment capacities caused by 
alcohol are currently defined by giving appropriate 
threshold ratios (specific) of substances in the blood 
or in the exhaled air, while the cause of the same 
condition caused by narcotic drugs is defined in a 
descriptive manner. This may raise doubts from the 
point of view of the aforementioned principle of 
specificity of features of offenses (Art. 42 (1) of the 
Polish Constitution). One must note, however, that 
the Constitutional Tribunal has refused to follow up 
on the constitutional complaint on this issue, 
substantiating its decision with the lack of doubts 
concerning interpretation of the law (the clara non 
sunt interpretanda principle) [22].  
Nevertheless, the decision of the 
Tribunal does not mean that an optimum 
regulation of this matter should not be sought.  
Theoretically, it is possible to use a limited 
legal definition of the conditions in question, by 
giving mathematically definite contents (quantities) 
of chemical substances. However, giving a specific 
definition, e.g. by introducing the so-called 
threshold ratios, found in the offender's blood, of 
only a single substance (e.g. THC, because 
detection of this substance and its metabolites is 
relatively the easiest), when the definitions of 
other substances remain descriptive (which, given 
the lack of popular diagnostic techniques, is 
inevitable), would not meet the requirements of 
rational legislation. Such a solution appears to be 
internally inconsistent. If it is concluded that it 
would be proper to provide a more detailed 
definition of the condition under the influence (and 
after consumption) of cannabis and its derivatives, 
the question that arises is: What arguments would 
justify continued descriptive definition of condition 
of psychomotor impairment caused by other 
narcotic drugs? This legislative proposal could be 
justified by the "popularity" of cannabis and its 
derivatives or by difficulties due to the 
toxicological diagnostics of other narcotic drugs.  
However, this justification is insufficient. 
Determination of the concentration of chemicals in 
blood, affecting the psychomotor capacity of a 
person, appears to be possible also in the case of 






In conclusion, the terms "condition under 
the influence" and "condition after the 
consumption" of a narcotic drug have been, in the 
scope corresponding to the form of this article, 
characterized quite precisely in the aforementioned 
judgments of the Supreme Court. Defining those 
terms by introducing the so-called threshold ratios 
would be reasonable only if it applied to all narcotic 
drugs. Answering the question of whether such a 
legislative measure would be feasible requires 
extensive knowledge in the field of toxicology and 
forensic techniques.  
One must note, however, that both the 




doctrine [24] and the jurisprudence [25] point at the 
lack of possibility or significant difficulty to create 
an exhaustive list and to specify the so-called 
limiting quantities of substances contained in 
narcotic drugs.  
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